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Exam 45: James Rachels

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Question 21

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James Rachels: Active and Passive Euthanasia Active euthanasia is the intentional termination of a patient's life by another person, for the sake of relieving the pain and suffering of the patient. Passive euthanasia is the cessation of medical assistance needed to prolong a patient's life, again performed for the sake of relieving pain and suffering. The conventional doctrine in medical ethics is that whereas passive euthanasia is sometimes morally permissible, active euthanasia never is. Rachels argues that the conventional doctrine faces serious objections, and cannot be correct. Rachels raises two objections to the conventional doctrine. The first is that the purpose of euthanasia is to alleviate pain and suffering, and in many cases active euthanasia can serve this function much more efficiently than passive euthanasia. Thus, if a decision has been made to employ euthanasia, active euthanasia is preferable to passive euthanasia. Rachels's second objection is that the conventional doctrine leads to decisions about life and death being made on morally irrelevant grounds. For example, passive euthanasia is sometimes employed on infants born with Down's syndrome who would require a simple surgery to survive. Such infants are allowed to die not because they require surgery, but because they have Down's syndrome. The decision to euthanize such infants depends on the irrelevant fact that they require a simple operation. The acceptance of the conventional doctrine is often grounded in the view that killing is intrinsically worse than letting die. Against this, Rachels imagines two cases that are exactly alike in every respect, except that one involves killing and the other involves letting die. In the first case, Smith drowns his young cousin to gain his inheritance. In the second case, Jones, like Smith, intends to kill his young cousin, but ends up (because of a slippery bath tub) merely watching him drown. Rachels claims that the two men behave equally wrongly, and that this shows there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die. The distinction between killing and letting die thus cannot be used to support the conventional doctrine -Should euthanasia be allowed? If so, is there any morally significant difference between active and passive euthanasia? Defend your answer.

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Question 22

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James Rachels: Active and Passive Euthanasia Active euthanasia is the intentional termination of a patient's life by another person, for the sake of relieving the pain and suffering of the patient. Passive euthanasia is the cessation of medical assistance needed to prolong a patient's life, again performed for the sake of relieving pain and suffering. The conventional doctrine in medical ethics is that whereas passive euthanasia is sometimes morally permissible, active euthanasia never is. Rachels argues that the conventional doctrine faces serious objections, and cannot be correct. Rachels raises two objections to the conventional doctrine. The first is that the purpose of euthanasia is to alleviate pain and suffering, and in many cases active euthanasia can serve this function much more efficiently than passive euthanasia. Thus, if a decision has been made to employ euthanasia, active euthanasia is preferable to passive euthanasia. Rachels's second objection is that the conventional doctrine leads to decisions about life and death being made on morally irrelevant grounds. For example, passive euthanasia is sometimes employed on infants born with Down's syndrome who would require a simple surgery to survive. Such infants are allowed to die not because they require surgery, but because they have Down's syndrome. The decision to euthanize such infants depends on the irrelevant fact that they require a simple operation. The acceptance of the conventional doctrine is often grounded in the view that killing is intrinsically worse than letting die. Against this, Rachels imagines two cases that are exactly alike in every respect, except that one involves killing and the other involves letting die. In the first case, Smith drowns his young cousin to gain his inheritance. In the second case, Jones, like Smith, intends to kill his young cousin, but ends up (because of a slippery bath tub) merely watching him drown. Rachels claims that the two men behave equally wrongly, and that this shows there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die. The distinction between killing and letting die thus cannot be used to support the conventional doctrine -In Rachels's case of Smith and Jones:

A) Smith and Jones have the same intentions.
B) Smith intents to kill while Jones does not.
C) Jones intents to kill while Smith does not.
D) neither Jones nor Smith intents to kill.

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Question 23

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James Rachels: Active and Passive Euthanasia Active euthanasia is the intentional termination of a patient's life by another person, for the sake of relieving the pain and suffering of the patient. Passive euthanasia is the cessation of medical assistance needed to prolong a patient's life, again performed for the sake of relieving pain and suffering. The conventional doctrine in medical ethics is that whereas passive euthanasia is sometimes morally permissible, active euthanasia never is. Rachels argues that the conventional doctrine faces serious objections, and cannot be correct. Rachels raises two objections to the conventional doctrine. The first is that the purpose of euthanasia is to alleviate pain and suffering, and in many cases active euthanasia can serve this function much more efficiently than passive euthanasia. Thus, if a decision has been made to employ euthanasia, active euthanasia is preferable to passive euthanasia. Rachels's second objection is that the conventional doctrine leads to decisions about life and death being made on morally irrelevant grounds. For example, passive euthanasia is sometimes employed on infants born with Down's syndrome who would require a simple surgery to survive. Such infants are allowed to die not because they require surgery, but because they have Down's syndrome. The decision to euthanize such infants depends on the irrelevant fact that they require a simple operation. The acceptance of the conventional doctrine is often grounded in the view that killing is intrinsically worse than letting die. Against this, Rachels imagines two cases that are exactly alike in every respect, except that one involves killing and the other involves letting die. In the first case, Smith drowns his young cousin to gain his inheritance. In the second case, Jones, like Smith, intends to kill his young cousin, but ends up (because of a slippery bath tub) merely watching him drown. Rachels claims that the two men behave equally wrongly, and that this shows there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die. The distinction between killing and letting die thus cannot be used to support the conventional doctrine -According to the conventional doctrine, active euthanasia is not morally permissible except in rare circumstances.

James Rachels: Active and Passive Euthanasia Active euthanasia is the intentional termination of a patient's life by another person, for the sake of relieving the pain and suffering of the patient. Passive euthanasia is the cessation of medical assistance needed to prolong a patient's life, again performed for the sake of relieving pain and suffering. The conventional doctrine in medical ethics is that whereas passive euthanasia is sometimes morally permissible, active euthanasia never is. Rachels argues that the conventional doctrine faces serious objections, and cannot be correct. Rachels raises two objections to the conventional doctrine. The first is that the purpose of euthanasia is to alleviate pain and suffering, and in many cases active euthanasia can serve this function much more efficiently than passive euthanasia. Thus, if a decision has been made to employ euthanasia, active euthanasia is preferable to passive euthanasia. Rachels's second objection is that the conventional doctrine leads to decisions about life and death being made on morally irrelevant grounds. For example, passive euthanasia is sometimes employed on infants born with Down's syndrome who would require a simple surgery to survive. Such infants are allowed to die not because they require surgery, but because they have Down's syndrome. The decision to euthanize such infants depends on the irrelevant fact that they require a simple operation. The acceptance of the conventional doctrine is often grounded in the view that killing is intrinsically worse than letting die. Against this, Rachels imagines two cases that are exactly alike in every respect, except that one involves killing and the other involves letting die. In the first case, Smith drowns his young cousin to gain his inheritance. In the second case, Jones, like Smith, intends to kill his young cousin, but ends up (because of a slippery bath tub) merely watching him drown. Rachels claims that the two men behave equally wrongly, and that this shows there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die. The distinction between killing and letting die thus cannot be used to support the conventional doctrine -Rachels claims that active euthanasia:

James Rachels: Active and Passive Euthanasia Active euthanasia is the intentional termination of a patient's life by another person, for the sake of relieving the pain and suffering of the patient. Passive euthanasia is the cessation of medical assistance needed to prolong a patient's life, again performed for the sake of relieving pain and suffering. The conventional doctrine in medical ethics is that whereas passive euthanasia is sometimes morally permissible, active euthanasia never is. Rachels argues that the conventional doctrine faces serious objections, and cannot be correct. Rachels raises two objections to the conventional doctrine. The first is that the purpose of euthanasia is to alleviate pain and suffering, and in many cases active euthanasia can serve this function much more efficiently than passive euthanasia. Thus, if a decision has been made to employ euthanasia, active euthanasia is preferable to passive euthanasia. Rachels's second objection is that the conventional doctrine leads to decisions about life and death being made on morally irrelevant grounds. For example, passive euthanasia is sometimes employed on infants born with Down's syndrome who would require a simple surgery to survive. Such infants are allowed to die not because they require surgery, but because they have Down's syndrome. The decision to euthanize such infants depends on the irrelevant fact that they require a simple operation. The acceptance of the conventional doctrine is often grounded in the view that killing is intrinsically worse than letting die. Against this, Rachels imagines two cases that are exactly alike in every respect, except that one involves killing and the other involves letting die. In the first case, Smith drowns his young cousin to gain his inheritance. In the second case, Jones, like Smith, intends to kill his young cousin, but ends up (because of a slippery bath tub) merely watching him drown. Rachels claims that the two men behave equally wrongly, and that this shows there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die. The distinction between killing and letting die thus cannot be used to support the conventional doctrine -Rachels claims that:

James Rachels: Active and Passive Euthanasia Active euthanasia is the intentional termination of a patient's life by another person, for the sake of relieving the pain and suffering of the patient. Passive euthanasia is the cessation of medical assistance needed to prolong a patient's life, again performed for the sake of relieving pain and suffering. The conventional doctrine in medical ethics is that whereas passive euthanasia is sometimes morally permissible, active euthanasia never is. Rachels argues that the conventional doctrine faces serious objections, and cannot be correct. Rachels raises two objections to the conventional doctrine. The first is that the purpose of euthanasia is to alleviate pain and suffering, and in many cases active euthanasia can serve this function much more efficiently than passive euthanasia. Thus, if a decision has been made to employ euthanasia, active euthanasia is preferable to passive euthanasia. Rachels's second objection is that the conventional doctrine leads to decisions about life and death being made on morally irrelevant grounds. For example, passive euthanasia is sometimes employed on infants born with Down's syndrome who would require a simple surgery to survive. Such infants are allowed to die not because they require surgery, but because they have Down's syndrome. The decision to euthanize such infants depends on the irrelevant fact that they require a simple operation. The acceptance of the conventional doctrine is often grounded in the view that killing is intrinsically worse than letting die. Against this, Rachels imagines two cases that are exactly alike in every respect, except that one involves killing and the other involves letting die. In the first case, Smith drowns his young cousin to gain his inheritance. In the second case, Jones, like Smith, intends to kill his young cousin, but ends up (because of a slippery bath tub) merely watching him drown. Rachels claims that the two men behave equally wrongly, and that this shows there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die. The distinction between killing and letting die thus cannot be used to support the conventional doctrine -According to Rachels, the case of Smith and Jones shows that:

James Rachels: Active and Passive Euthanasia Active euthanasia is the intentional termination of a patient's life by another person, for the sake of relieving the pain and suffering of the patient. Passive euthanasia is the cessation of medical assistance needed to prolong a patient's life, again performed for the sake of relieving pain and suffering. The conventional doctrine in medical ethics is that whereas passive euthanasia is sometimes morally permissible, active euthanasia never is. Rachels argues that the conventional doctrine faces serious objections, and cannot be correct. Rachels raises two objections to the conventional doctrine. The first is that the purpose of euthanasia is to alleviate pain and suffering, and in many cases active euthanasia can serve this function much more efficiently than passive euthanasia. Thus, if a decision has been made to employ euthanasia, active euthanasia is preferable to passive euthanasia. Rachels's second objection is that the conventional doctrine leads to decisions about life and death being made on morally irrelevant grounds. For example, passive euthanasia is sometimes employed on infants born with Down's syndrome who would require a simple surgery to survive. Such infants are allowed to die not because they require surgery, but because they have Down's syndrome. The decision to euthanize such infants depends on the irrelevant fact that they require a simple operation. The acceptance of the conventional doctrine is often grounded in the view that killing is intrinsically worse than letting die. Against this, Rachels imagines two cases that are exactly alike in every respect, except that one involves killing and the other involves letting die. In the first case, Smith drowns his young cousin to gain his inheritance. In the second case, Jones, like Smith, intends to kill his young cousin, but ends up (because of a slippery bath tub) merely watching him drown. Rachels claims that the two men behave equally wrongly, and that this shows there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die. The distinction between killing and letting die thus cannot be used to support the conventional doctrine -Rachels claims that there is no moral difference between active and passive euthanasia, considered in themselves.

James Rachels: Active and Passive Euthanasia Active euthanasia is the intentional termination of a patient's life by another person, for the sake of relieving the pain and suffering of the patient. Passive euthanasia is the cessation of medical assistance needed to prolong a patient's life, again performed for the sake of relieving pain and suffering. The conventional doctrine in medical ethics is that whereas passive euthanasia is sometimes morally permissible, active euthanasia never is. Rachels argues that the conventional doctrine faces serious objections, and cannot be correct. Rachels raises two objections to the conventional doctrine. The first is that the purpose of euthanasia is to alleviate pain and suffering, and in many cases active euthanasia can serve this function much more efficiently than passive euthanasia. Thus, if a decision has been made to employ euthanasia, active euthanasia is preferable to passive euthanasia. Rachels's second objection is that the conventional doctrine leads to decisions about life and death being made on morally irrelevant grounds. For example, passive euthanasia is sometimes employed on infants born with Down's syndrome who would require a simple surgery to survive. Such infants are allowed to die not because they require surgery, but because they have Down's syndrome. The decision to euthanize such infants depends on the irrelevant fact that they require a simple operation. The acceptance of the conventional doctrine is often grounded in the view that killing is intrinsically worse than letting die. Against this, Rachels imagines two cases that are exactly alike in every respect, except that one involves killing and the other involves letting die. In the first case, Smith drowns his young cousin to gain his inheritance. In the second case, Jones, like Smith, intends to kill his young cousin, but ends up (because of a slippery bath tub) merely watching him drown. Rachels claims that the two men behave equally wrongly, and that this shows there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die. The distinction between killing and letting die thus cannot be used to support the conventional doctrine -According to Rachels, in cases of passive euthanasia the doctor does not do anything.

James Rachels: Active and Passive Euthanasia Active euthanasia is the intentional termination of a patient's life by another person, for the sake of relieving the pain and suffering of the patient. Passive euthanasia is the cessation of medical assistance needed to prolong a patient's life, again performed for the sake of relieving pain and suffering. The conventional doctrine in medical ethics is that whereas passive euthanasia is sometimes morally permissible, active euthanasia never is. Rachels argues that the conventional doctrine faces serious objections, and cannot be correct. Rachels raises two objections to the conventional doctrine. The first is that the purpose of euthanasia is to alleviate pain and suffering, and in many cases active euthanasia can serve this function much more efficiently than passive euthanasia. Thus, if a decision has been made to employ euthanasia, active euthanasia is preferable to passive euthanasia. Rachels's second objection is that the conventional doctrine leads to decisions about life and death being made on morally irrelevant grounds. For example, passive euthanasia is sometimes employed on infants born with Down's syndrome who would require a simple surgery to survive. Such infants are allowed to die not because they require surgery, but because they have Down's syndrome. The decision to euthanize such infants depends on the irrelevant fact that they require a simple operation. The acceptance of the conventional doctrine is often grounded in the view that killing is intrinsically worse than letting die. Against this, Rachels imagines two cases that are exactly alike in every respect, except that one involves killing and the other involves letting die. In the first case, Smith drowns his young cousin to gain his inheritance. In the second case, Jones, like Smith, intends to kill his young cousin, but ends up (because of a slippery bath tub) merely watching him drown. Rachels claims that the two men behave equally wrongly, and that this shows there is no morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die. The distinction between killing and letting die thus cannot be used to support the conventional doctrine -Rachels claims that the conventional doctrine is mistaken.